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DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND. 
By Peter Reuter. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1983. 
Pp. xii, 233. $17.50. 
No nation can tolerate a highly structured monolithic under-
world that circumvents the laws of society and directs criminal oper-
ations throughout the country. The problem has attracted much 
attention in the United StatesI because of a widely held perception 
1. W. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITIEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME, 1950-1952, 184 
(1974) ("Public response to the hearings exceeded even the most optimistic predictions: Seven-
teen times as many people viewed the morning telecasts as watched the usual programs and 
over 80 percent of those who watched television observed the crime hearings. An estimated 20 
million to 30 million people viewed the hearings across the nation."); THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
ORGANIZED CRIME (1967); J. McCLELLAN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT (1962); THE 
KEFAUVER COMMITTEE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME (1951); Hearings before a Special Suh-
commillee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. United States Senate, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess. & 82d Cong., 1st Sess., vols. 1-5 (1950-1951). 
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that organized crime does in fact exist in this nation. Peter Reuter2 
sets out to improve understanding of this perceived criminal sub-
structure by examining illegal markets in the economic framework 
of industrial organization analysis. He attempts to discredit the stan-
dard orthodoxy "that illegal markets are typically dominated by a 
single group whose power rests on the control of corrupt public au-
thority and the command of overwhelming violence" (p. 2). 
Relying on data gathered from police files, confiscated records, 
and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, 
Reuter makes a detailed economic study of bookmaking, numbers 
operations, and loansharking in New York City. No special training 
is needed to follow his arguments; even a reader who dislikes eco-
nomics will find Renter's description of illegal markets both compre-
hensible and enlightening. Renter's clear and concise discussion of 
each market gives the reader a glimpse into a clandestine and often 
misperceived American subculture. 
Reuter couples his examination of illegal markets with an analy-
sis of the economic consequences of product illegality. He discusses 
the principles of industrial organization and then examines the effect 
of the illegal status of underworld markets on such organizations. 
Reuter argues that the need to escape police detection makes it im-
possible for criminal enterprises to take advantage of economies of 
scale and customer goodwill. In addition, the lack of legally enforce-
able contracts and auditable books cripples the criminal entrepre-
neur's efforts to obtain external finance. The author concludes "that 
numerous purely economic consequences, 'invisible hand' factors, 
lead to illegal markets being served by localized, fragmented, 
ephemeral, and undiversified enterprises" (pp. 130-31). 
Reuter then examines countervailing forces that might overcome 
the economic factors that deter the mass organization of criminal 
activities. The accepted view is that corruption of public authority 
and command of overwhelming violence are necessary for the devel-
opment of a criminal network and the monopolization of illegal 
markets. Reuter refers to these non-economic countervailing forces 
as the "visible hand" (pp. 2, 130, 177). 
Arguably, the criminal organization that controls public author-
ity will operate freely and be able to prevent the entry of others into 
illegal markets. Reuter asserts, however, that such a view ignores the 
complexity of current methods of enforcement. There are a variety 
of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local levels; the 
overlap of their respective jurisdictions makes it difficult for 
criminals to control law enforcement mechanisms effectively. This 
multiplicity of authority also increases the likelihood that corrupt of-
2. Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. 
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fi.cials will be detected. Given the complex structure of the system, 
"corruption on the part of law enforcement agencies could lead to 
more decentralized market structures than a situation of no corrup-
tion and random enforcement" (p. 124). 
Reuter is equally skeptical of the effectiveness of violence as a 
way to monopolize illegal markets. He examines, in the context of 
the criminal organization, the role of violence in dispute resolution, 
employee and customer control, advancement within the organiza-
tion, and suppression of competition. Reuter argues that the costs of 
violent monopolization of markets as well as the increased threat of 
police action outweigh the monopoly returns from such markets. He 
claims that "only in very narrowly defined circumstances . . . is it 
advantageous for the illegal enterprise to use control of a dominant 
force, in effect an army, for the purpose of eliminating competition" 
(p. 132). The author therefore concludes that forces of corruption 
and violence do not overcome the tendency of illegal markets toward 
small and ephemeral enterprises: "[T]he invisible hand is victori-
ous" (p. 2). 
Reuter's examination of the role of violence in dispute resolution 
leads him to investigate the Italian syndicates and their mediation of 
underworld conflicts. This discussion leaves the reader with a sense 
of inconsistency in Reuter's work. During most of the book, Reuter 
seems intent on destroying any romantic perception of organized 
crime. In his chapter on Italian crime networks, however, he seems 
to legitimate the activities of the Italian syndicates. 
Reuter asserts that the "Mafia" does not centrally direct a na-
tional conspiracy, but he does speak ofloose relations between "Ma-
fia" families throughout the nation. He then examines the "Mafia's" 
role as an arbiter of underworld disputes. In the course of his dicus-
sion, Reuter suggests that the "Mafia" is the only form of nationally 
organized crime and that it is primarily financed by funds that it 
earns from the provision of underworld quasi-judicial services. Reu-
ter discusses the existence of the "Mafia" and asserts "its durability 
and stability" (p. 159) in a book that uses economic analysis to 
demonstrate the disorganized nature of crime. The Italian syndi-
cates thus appear romantic; they organize and supervise despite eco-
nomic disincentives that prevent organization of other groups in 
illegal markets. The Italian syndicates also appear desirable in that 
they limit the need for violence in dispute resolution: their decisions 
are self-enforcing due to the syndicates' reputation for violence, not 
necessarily their use of violence. These legitimating undercurrents 
are generally inconsistent with the remainder of Reuter's book. 
Another unfortunate aspect of Reuter's analysis is that it attrib-
utes minimal importance to the impact that non-economic, irrational 
considerations have on underworld operations. The author does 
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note the difficulty in quantifying such factors, but his analysis cannot 
be complete without such consideration. For example, Reuter notes 
the significant roles of reward and intimidation in ensuring an em-
ployee's loyalty. He does mention the non-economic factor of family 
ties but fails to develop the point further. The author gives no other 
consideration to irrational factors as they relate to a criminal's loy-
alty, nor does he examine the role that the desire for power and pres-
tige play in the development of a criminal organization. The 
discerning reader must question the wisdom of relying on rational 
models to explain criminal behavior. 
A complete paradigm of criminal behavior requires attention to 
the sociological and psychological influences on the criminal subcul-
ture. In contrast, the author, in discussing the "Mafia," spends little 
more than a page addressing the factors underlying the peculiar suc-
cess of Italian criminal organizations: the historical Sicilian suspi-
cion of government, the reinforcement of that suspicion by 
America's response to waves of Italian immigration, the ambition of 
the young members of homogeneous criminal gangs, and the timing 
of Prohibition (pp. 159-60). Reuter dismisses this discussion as "lit-
tle more than plausible speculation" (p. 160).3 Later, he casually ex-
plains the Italian syndicate's failure to settle disputes in black and 
Hispanic communities as a result of ethnic behavior - the "greater 
willingness in the black and Hispanic gangs to make use of violence, 
seen as a very critical symbol of individual worth" (p. 171).4 As the 
author moves from economic analysis to discussions about the socio-
logical and psychological aspects of crime, the reader must increas-
ingly question the validity of his analysis. 
Although .Disorganized Crime is an interesting academic exercise, 
most readers will ultimately question the book's accuracy. Reuter's 
economic arguments are seemingly sound, but his data base is highly 
suspect. Throughout the book, he notes the underlying assumptions 
and general weaknesses associated with his data. In conducting his 
research, for example, the author relied upon only seven informants 
on a continuing basis; he further acknowledges that only one of 
those informants "might be regarded as totally trustworthy" (p. 195). 
In addition, Reuter admits to being at odds with most of the authori-
ties as to the implications of the information that he compiled. 
There is also no way to determine whether illegal business is accu-
rately portrayed by the records on which the author relied. In short, 
3. Commentaries suggest that the link between "Mafia" success and these psychological 
and sociological factors goes beyond merely plausible speculation. See generally L. BARZINI, 
THE ITALIANS (1964); R. GAMBINO, BLOOD OF MY BLOOD: THE DILEMMA OF THE ITALIAN 
AMERICANS (1975). 
4. In this instance, the author does note the "risk of making weak generalizations about 
ethnic behavior .... " P. 171. 
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the evidence for Renter's conclusions is weak. This indictment is 
particularly telling because Reuter himself criticizes official views on 
organized crime because of their poor supporting evidence (pp. 3-7). 
Whatever their accuracy, Renter's conclusions lead to a limited 
prescription. Since the author believes that illegal markets and or-
ganized crime are not integrally related, he asserts that separating 
the two problems "is a necessary condition for effective action with 
respect to either of them" (p. 177). Although Renter's failure to 
make specific suggestions for dealing with either problem may be 
disappoi.µting, the omission is excusable because his goal is merely to 
increase understanding of illegal markets. And understanding is, af-
ter all, the first step toward control. 
